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Anarchy In The Airways
Abstract

In his dialogue - Anarchy In The Airways - Joseph C. Von Kornfeld, Assistant Professor, College of Hotel
Administration, University of Nevada, Las Vegas initially states: “Deregulation of the airline industry has
brought about financial vulnerability for the traveling public. The author analyzes the situation since that point
in time and makes recommendations for some solutions.”
In this article, Assistant Professor Von Kornfeld, first defines the airline industry in its pre-regulated form.
Then he goes into the ramifications and results of deregulating the industry, both in regards to the consumer,
and in deregulation’s impact on the airlines themselves.
“The most dramatic consequence of the pressures and turbulence of airline deregulation has been the
unprecedented proliferation of airline bankruptcies,” Von Kornfeld informs.
“Prior to the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, U.S. air carriers operated in a business
environment that was insulated from the normal stresses and strains of open competition. They were
restricted from actively competing with fares and routings by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),” Von
Kornfeld says.
In leveling the playing field, Von Kornfeld offers, “Each carrier was restricted to specific geographic routes,
with those routes limited to two or three competing carriers.
The only thing that set carriers apart in this CAB defined atmosphere was their ability to either advertise, or to
enhance their level of service; or both. “…ultimately paid for by the passenger through fare increases
sanctioned by the CAB,” Von Kornfeld states.
“Airline service standards were unquestionably superior during the regulated environment,” Von Kornfeld
renders an interesting observation.
He does mention, however, that carrier safety was also considered a concern immediately prior to, and then
after deregulation. “The major controversy focused on the allegation that safety and maintenance standards
would be compromised due to the financial pressures brought about by an openly competitive environment,”
Von Kornfeld says.
Pricing, as well as labor unions are important factors in the equation, and Von Kornfeld addresses their
relevance in the deregulated environment.
“The primary rationalization for deregulation was to facilitate a more openly competitive environment. The
increased competition was to ultimately have benefitted the consumer. Ironically, that’s not entirely the case,
Von Kornfeld elaborates.
In addressing some of the negative aspects of airline deregulation, Von Kornfeld suggests that some sort of
federal re-regulation may be in order.
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Deregulation of theairline industry has brought about financial vulnerability
for the traveling public. The author analyzes the situation since that point
in time and makes recommendations for some solutions.

Prior to the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, U.S.
air carriers operated in a business environment that was insulated from
the normal stresses and strains of opencompetition. They were restricted
from actively competingwith fares and routings by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB).Any variation of the standard determinants of growth and
profitability, such as capitalization,equipment utilization, cost controls,
and productivity, had minimal impact in enhancing one carrier's position over another. Each carrier was restricted to specific geographic
routes, usually limited to two or three competing carriers. The dominant
carriers with larger fleets were effectively prohibited from expanding
their route structure and encroaching on the markets of existing
competitors.
Considering that all fares were identical within the specified protected route structures of theindividualcarriers, themarketing strategy
that could be employed in order to increase market share was essentially limited to two costly methods. The first was extravagant advertising and promotional campaigns among the competing carriers, with the
primary benefactor being the advertising agencies. The other was product variation and enhancement. Both factors had a significant and tangible impact upon a carrier's reputation and identity within the
marketplace, although ultimately paid for by the passenger through fare
increases sanctioned by the CAB.
Airline service standards were unquestionably superior during the
regulated environment; for example; food service was far more lavish
and appealing due to the diversity of menu planning and a higher standard of quality in both preparation and presentation. There was ample
comfort for passengers. This usually meant fewer available seats per aircraft which warranted an increase in the frequency of service, which, in
turn, meant fewer passengers per plane. All of these factors contributed
to high operatingcosts, with little incentive for cost containment. Any
increases in operating costs were usually negated by routinely applying for fare increases by documenting the increased costs to the CAB,
which inmost cases was found to be justified. Additionally, management
had little incentive to contain labor costs as increased payroll expen-
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ditures also contributed to the justification for increased fares by the
CAB. This scenario perpetuated itself for decades and is the primary
reason why the airline industry has traditionally offered extravagant
salaries and very lucrative fringe benefits.
With deregulation on the horizon in the mid '70s, the larger carriers
were for the most part in favor of it, and the smaller carriers were opposed. The major controversy focused on the allegation that safety and
maintenance standards would be compromised due to the financial
pressures brought about by an openly competitiveenvironment.The r e
cent increase in accidents and fatalities has revived this controversy and
has facilitated additional concern and support regarding this allegation.
The deregulation of the airline industry occurred in phases starting
in 1978with the substantial expansion of the route structures of the existing carriers; subsequently, a laissez-fairepricing structure evolved.
The final phase of deregulation culminated with the complete abolition
of the CAB on December 31,1984.Another significant factor during the
transition period was the entry of a multitude of new carriers into the
marketplace. Initially, the existing carriers weren't concerned, as they
were in a far better position in terms of capitalization, expertise, and
identity.
However, there was a revolutionary change in the marketing
strategiesthat could now be employed by the various air carriers. Airlines
traditionallyhad two strategicoptions. First, they could competein terms
of product variation and enhancement and with advertising and promotional campaigns. Second,price and routes had become unprecedented
and effective variants of the marketing options available. For the first
time, the airlineswere exposed to open competition which translated into
survival of the fittest.
The new carriers entering the marketplace had one primary competitive advantage: far lower labor costs. The new carriers were nonunion;therefore, management had absolute discretionin setting salary
scales and fringe benefits. Additionally, the management philosophy of
the new carriersstressedcross-trainingand utilization of personnel, which
ensured higher productivity. In contrast, the traditional carriers were
compelled to deal with as many as six different labor unions per airline.
They were confronted withunproductiveand archaic work rules, and with
militant employeeswho had substantial senioritywith greater allegiance
to their respective unions rather than to the companies that employed
them. The dichotomy of the methods of management between the old
and new carriers contributed to amore fiercelycompetitive environment.
Somethinghad to give, and the passenger was caught in the crosswind.
'The Passenger Is The Creditor
In this credit-orientedeconomy,the provider of goods and services
is usually perceived as the creditor. Whether for the purchase of a set
of luggage, for checking into a hotel, or for obtaining a meal in a
restaurant, the consumer has the goods conveyed to his possession or
the services rendered, and only then, through either a formal credit contract or by custom, is payment made.
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The purchase of an airline ticket provides an unconventionalperspective. If viewed objectively, a passenger is required to pay for passage
in full prior to embarkation by cash, check, or credit card. The airline will
then issue a ticket, usually agreeing to provide passage on a specified
future date. If the ticket is not purchasedin advance, it is highly unlikely that the desired flight will be available. This procedure renders the
passenger financially vulnerable for a loss in the event that an air carrier cannot provide for the agreed passage or for a refund of the amount
rendered.
Compoundingthe financial vulnerability of the airline passenger still
further is the advance purchase requirement in order to qualify for discount fares. This type of promotional fare, sometimes referred to as
" Super-saver" or "Ultra-Saver," requires the passenger to purchase the
ticket prior to departure in order to qualify for a significant discount.
The advance purchase requirement usually ranges from three to 30 days.
Lately, however, the trend has been toward the 30-day requirement.
The availability of advance purchase discount seats is restricted in
yet another manner, through controlled capacity. This concept means
that the airlines allocate a specific block of seats for a specific promotional fare on designated flights correlated with internal load factor
statistical data. The reality of this practice usually requires the passenger
to purchase his Super-Saver ticket as much as 60 days in advance in order
to qualify for a seat on a flight of his or her choosing. I t is interesting
to note that an airline is not required to disclose how many, or if any, discount seats were allocated for a particular flight.
Another factor to consider is that in the event a passenger secures
a seat on a Super-saver fare basis, he or she is usually subject to a 25 or
50 percent penalty factor if helshe should change an itinerary or cancel
a reservation due to unforeseen circumstances. If the trend continues,
it is highly probable that some air carriers will require the forfeiture of
the entire fare in the event of a cancellation. Conversely,if an air carrier
cannot accommodate a passenger with a confirmed reservation due to
a flight cancellation, there is no regulatory remedy available to the
passenger. Flight cancellationscan be attributed to inadequate crew staffing, mechanical problems, equipment shortages, or inclement weather.
Passengers Incur Expenses

In many cases, passengers left stranded due to flight cancellations
incur increased travel expenses for hotel accommodations,meals, andlor
alternate transportation. The inconvenienceand expense of being stranded can also be attributed to missed connectionsdue to numerous factors.
There is no regulatory remedy available to the passenger once again.
These stranded passenger scenarios are not to be confused with those
passengers who are denied boardingdue to the overbookingof a particular
flight. In this case there is a regulatory remedy known as the Denied Boarding CompensationAct, previously enforced by the CAB and now under
the purview of theDepartment of Transportation. Needless to say, this
paradox in cancellation policies places the passenger in an inequitable,
precarious, and uncompromising situation which is inconsistent with
most consumer transactions.

FIU Hospitality Review, Voulme 5, Number 1, 1987
Copyright: Contents © 1987 by FIUHospitality Review. Thereproduction of any artwork,
editorial, or other materialis expressly prohibited without written permission from
the publisher.

Prior to deregulation,if apassenger could not be accommodated due
to a cancelled flight or missed connection, most air carriers would provide alternate transportation, hotel accommodations, and meals. This
was a customary practice in order to retain the goodwill of the passenger
and to protect the reputation of the airline.Additionally,prior to deregulation, the CAB would not permit fare structures to be established on a
controlled capacity basis, as they could be perceived as loss leaders which
could contribute to "bait and switch" activities. The airlines were also
prohibited from imposing penalty factors due to cancellations.
Management's rationale for the pricing structure of advance purchase (Super-saver)fares has a two-fold approach. From a marketing
point of view, the advance purchase requirement and other restrictions
make the fare inconvenient and inaccessible for the committed (business
traveler)segment of the market; at the same time, it stimulates demand
from the discretionary (pleasuretraveler) segment of the marketplace
which tends to be price sensitive. Secondly,from a financialpoint of view,
this pricing strategy obviously enhances the cash flow position of any
carrier receivingrevenuefor serviceswhich aren't required to be provided
until some distant point in the future.
Recent promotional trends indicate that some carriers are engaging in highly imprudent pricing practices. As an example, if a ticket is
purchased at present at the regular rate, the passenger is then eligible
to purchase a ticket on a 2-for-1basis at some distant date which can be
as much as six months in the future. Another unorthodox advancepurchase promotion encourages buying four tickets to a specific destination and receiving four more at no cost. These practices can and should
be viewed as a distress sale, indicating a severe cash flow problem.
Airline Casualties Increase

The most dramatic consequenceof the pressures and turbulence of
airline deregulation has been the unprecedented proliferation of airline
bankruptcies.
Since the Airline Deregulation Act was implemented in 1978,53
scheduled air carriers have filed for bankruptcyprotectionunder Chapter
11.Table 1illustrates the names of the scheduled air carriers and theyears
in which they filed for bankruptcy. Some of the carriers may not be
familiar, as they operated as regional or feeder carriers with routings confined to specific geographic regions of the country.
The primary rationalization for deregulation was to facilitatea more
openly competitive environment. The increased competition was to
ultimately have benefitted the consumer. Ironically, however, the Department of Justice's Anti-Trust Division has radically changed its policies
by approving airline mergers and take-oversin an unprecedented manner, which ultimately can and will minimize competition. This revolutionary change in policy was necessitated in order to minimize the prospect of additional airline bankruptcies. It is entirely possible that within
the next two to three years there may be only seven or eight major trunk
carriers.
Table 1clearly demonstrates the financialvulnerabilityof the travel-
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Table 1

The following scheduled air carriers filed for bankruptcy protection since the inception of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978:
1979

American Central
*New York Airways

Aeroamerica
*Mackey International
1980

Florida Airlines

Indiana Airways
1981

Apollo Airways (later
Pacific Coast Airlines)
*LANICA
Tejas Airlines

Air Bahia
Coral Air
Golden Gate Airlines
Mountain West Airlines
1982

Aero Virgin Islands
Air North
Air South
Astec Air East
Cochise Airlines
Silver State Airlines
Will's Airlines

AeroSun International
Air Pennsylvania
Altair Airlines
*Braniff International
North American Airlines
Swift Aire Lines
1983

*Continental Airlines
Inland Empire Airlines
State Airlines

Golden West Airlines
National Florida Airlines
1984

*Air Florida
Air Vermont
Atlantic Gulf
Dolphin Airways
Excellair
New York Helicopter
Pacific Air East
Wien Airlines

Air Illinois
American International
Combs Airways
Emerald
Hamrnond's Commuter Air Service
Oceanair Line
Pacific Express
Wright Airlines
1985

Northeastern International

*Provincetown-Boston Airlines
1986

Pride Air

Air Hawaii
*Frontier Airlines

* Designates air carriers in operation prior to the deregulation act of 1978.
ing public. 3xact losses quotable in dollars would be extremely difficult
to ascertain, as the bankruptcy proceedings were held in a variety of
federalbankruptcy court jurisdictions, and many prospective passengers
have never filed a creditor's claim. I t is also important to note that in
the case where a passenger has filed a claim, indemnification would be
highly unlikely, as the unaccommodated passenger would be deemed to
be an unsecured creditor, placing him or her in a low priority status.
Preferencein theliquidation of the assets of a bankrupt company would
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be prioritized by taxes owed to federal and state authorities, employee
payroll obligations, secured creditors such as the providers of equipment
and facilities, and unsecured creditors such as unaccommodated
passengers, respectively.
In the past, commercial aviation was under the strict regulation of
the federal government. Jurisdiction was shared by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).The
FAA is still intact, providing safety and technical oversight; however,
since the demise of the CAB, there has been a complete regulatory void,
leaving the traveling public totally exposed to deceptive trade practices,
inferior service standards, and financial vulnerability.The Department
of Transportation has inherited some of the jurisdictional responsibility from the CAB, but has demonstrated little concern in protecting the
public interest. Most of the transgressions and inequities would not be
tolerated within the customary consumer environment existing under
regulatory laws of the various states. Historically, however, there has
never been a need for state intervention or regulation except in the matter of intrastate air routes, so a void exists here as well.
I t is obvious that some sort of modified reregulation is justified in
order to at least protect the financial interests of the traveling public.
The CAB had provided stability and financial solvency to the airways,
and since its demise there have been phenomenal losses to both the consumers and the airline industry, which have contributed to anarchy in
the airways.
Legislative Remedies May Be In Order
One would assume that purchasing a cruise ticket for passage on
a foreign flag cruise line would place the prospective passenger at far
greater financial risk, considering that the average cost of a seven-day
cruiseis $1,500 per person. In most instances, a minimum of two people
travel together, which would amount to a cash outlay of $3,000. Additionally, most cruise passengers will book space far in advance, usually
three to four months. This is a comparable situation to that of the airline
passenger, whereby the passenger is the creditor and any number of unforeseen circumstances could place the prospective passengers' funds
in jeopardy. Situations could arise, such as damage to or the loss of a ship,
labor disputes, or international political turmoil, as well as a declaration
of bankruptcy. Any prospect of legal restitution would be further complicated and expensive by virtue of having to deal with various ramifications of international and admiralty law.
The reality of this cruiselairlinepassenger analogy is quite the contrary, due primarily to the fact that the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC)requires that any passenger vessel embarking from a U.S. port
must file a certificate of financial responsibility to provide for the indemnification of passengers in the event of non-performance of transportation. This performanceor surety bond is required pursuant to Sub-Part
A, Part 540, Title 46 of the United States Code of Federal Regulation.
Taking this pertinent precedent provided by the regulatory policy
of the FMC into consideration, a legislative remedy is obviously called
for in order to provide comparable financial protection to the airline
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passenger, under the auspices of the Department of Transportation.
I t would also be in the best interests of the various scheduled air carriers to post a surety bond in order to facilitate the restoration of the
public's confidence in commercial aviation.
Until the time comes that some sort of modified reregulation is
enacted, it might be in the best interest of the airlinepassenger to ascertain the financial solvency of the prospective air carrier with his
stockbroker prior to placing his reservation with the airline.
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